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MANDATORY ARREST OF DOMESTIC ABUSERS:
PANACEA OR PERPETUATION OF THE PROBLEM OF
ABUSE?
Drive down any street in America. More than one household in six has been
the scene of a spouse striking his or her partner ... .
INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence has been recognized as the number one health
issue facing women.' For purposes of this Comment, domestic vio-
lence is defined as the "'severe, deliberate and repeated demonstra-
ble physical violence' inflicted on a woman by a man with whom she
has or has had an intimate relationship."' Although the author rec-
ognizes that there are instances where women abuse men, this Com-
ment focuses on women as victims in light of the fact that over 95
percent of all domestic violence incidents involve men abusing
women." It is also important to recognize that domestic violence is
not limited to spousal relationships, but also extends to women who
date or live with abusers.
Despite the prevalence of battering in today's society,5 current so-
lutions to the problem have proven to be ineffective. Proponents of
mandatory arrest laws' suggest that domestic violence can be cur-
tailed by ensuring the arrest of offenders. This Comment addresses
the purported effectiveness of mandatory arrest laws as well as the
desirability and feasibility of mandatory arrest legislation in urban
areas such as Chicago, Illinois. It begins by highlighting the severity
1. MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 3
(1980).
2. Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 23,
25.
3. Janice C. Humphreys & William o. Humphreys, Mandatory Arrest: A Means of Primary
and Secondary Prevention of Abuse of Female Partners, 10 VICTIMOLOGY 267, 268 (1985) (cita-
tion omitted).
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 7-13 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of domestic violence
and its widespread effects).
6. Mandatory arrest statutes typically provide that the police must arrest the offender in a
domestic violence incident. For examples of typical mandatory arrest statutes, see infra note 162.
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of the problem of domestic violence, providing a typical profile of
the batterer, and describing why he batters. Next, this Comment
documents society's responses to battering and the varied legislative
changes which have resulted. To this end, this Comment considers
the genesis of mandatory arrest as a method of deterring abuse and
specifically discusses existing empirical data regarding the success of
mandatory arrest statutes. It further attempts to analyze the deter-
rent value of mandatory arrest laws, because unless such laws serve
to deter the batterer, they will ultimately prove ineffective at best,
and detrimental at worst. Finally, this Comment concludes that
mandatory arrest laws are neither feasible nor desirable in Chicago.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Domestic violence remains a leading cause of death and injury
among women.7 In 1992, for example, injuries from domestic vio-
lence exceeded the combined number of injuries to women caused
by auto accidents, rapes, and muggings during the year." Current
estimates suggest that as many as six million women are the victims
of domestic violence each year.9 These sobering statistics highlight a
disturbing truth - a woman today has more to fear from the man
she is intimate with than from a total stranger.10
Moreover, due to the phenomenon of underreporting, the reality is
7. Abigail Trafford, The Divorce-Violence Link, WASH. POST, June 21, 1994, § Z, at 6;
Martha Shirk, Domestic Violence is a Leading Hazard for Women, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH,
May 6, 1992, at 10A; see also Angelo Bruscas, Athletes Cross the Line: Simpson Not Only One
With Record of Domestic Violence, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCE, June 23, 1994, at Al (noting
that domestic violence is the number one cause of death in women).
8. Recent Developments: Restrictions on Release of Individuals Arrested for Domestic Vio-
lence, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 336, 366-67 (1992) [hereinafter Recent Developments]; see also Hoff-
man, supra note 2, at 25 ("C. Everett Koop, the former Surgeon General, has identified domestic
violence as the No. I health problem for American women, causing more injuries than automobile
accidents, muggings and rapes combined.").
9. Nicole M. Montalto, Note, Mandatory Arrest: The District of Columbia's Prevention of
Domestic Violence Amendment Act of 1990, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 337, 337 (1992)
(estimating "that between 1.8 and 6 million women are physically abused each year by the men
with whom they have been intimately involved"); Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 366
(paren).
10. Data also suggests that the injuries sustained by victims of domestic violence are far more
severe than those sustained by victims of assaults by strangers. Matthew Litsky, Note, Explaining
the Legal System's Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women: A Lack of Coordination, 8 J.
HUM. RTS. 149, 149 (1990). Domestic abuse also often involves weapons and extreme violence or
death. E.g., People v. Gray, 370 N.E.2d 797 (Il. 1977) (noting that a husband struck and shot his
wife with a gun); Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 371 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1977) (convicting a husband for
shooting and killing his wife).
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graver than the statistics suggest. According to admittedly conserva-
tive FBI estimates, only one in ten incidents of domestic violence is
actually reported. 1 The National Coalition Against Domestic Vio-
lence believes that underreporting is even more dramatic, claiming
that battered women report only one in one hundred incidents of
domestic violence. 12
The sheer breadth of the problem underscores the importance of
analyzing the legal and policy responses to battering. In order to
assess the potential effectiveness of efforts to deter battering, it is
first crucial to understand what type of individual batters and why
he does it.'3
A. Who Batters?
Domestic violence cuts across socioeconomic lines.' 4 In his semi-
nal work, Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American Family,
Murray Straus noted that "[w]ife-beating is found in every class, at
every income level."' 5 Straus explained, however, that certain demo-
graphic factors, such as age, income, and employment status, are
strongly correlated to the presence of domestic violence.' 6 Age con-
stitutes one of the factors linked to a higher incidence of battering. 7
Data indicates that violence is considerably more common among
younger couples.' 8 This is due, in part, to the fact that younger peo-
ple have more physical energy and are undergoing more social,
11. Sari Horwitz, D.C. Police to Make Arrests in Domestic Violence Disputes: Cases to be
Treated as Criminal Offenses, WASH. POST, June 3, 1987, at Al, A7.
12. Calling Police Protects Abused Wives, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1986, at A9. In
comparison, the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence claims that one out of every ten
rape victims reports the crime. Id.
13. Renata Vaselle-Augenstein & Annette Ehrlich, Male Batterers: Evidence for Psychopa-
thology, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 139, 139-40 (Emilio C. Viano
ed., 1992).
14. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 31.
15. Id.; see also Carolyn M. Sampselle et al., Violence Against Women: The Scope and Signifi-
cance of the Problem, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: NURSING RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND
PRACTICE ISSUES 3, 8 (Carolyn M. Sampselle ed., 1992) (stating that domestic violence affects all
economic classes).
16. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 151; see also Helen Rubenstein Holden, Comment, Does
the Legal System Batter Women? Vindicating Battered Women's Constitutional Rights to Ade-
quate Police Protection, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 705, 708 (1989) (noting that age, poverty, race, and
social isolation are related to domestic abuse).
17. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 140-44.
18. Id. Strauss defines younger couples as those under the age of thirty. Id. at 141. For further
discussion of the relationship between age and battering, see JAN E. STETS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND CONTROL 4-5 (1988); Holden, Comment, supra note 16, at 708.
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physical, and psychological changes.' 9 The early years of a marriage
are filled with major stress and adjustment, and are often accompa-
nied by other major life changes - such as the birth of a child
which contribute to increased stress and volatility."
Family income is also closely related to violence between couples.
It is estimated that impoverished women face a substantially greater
chance of being beaten by a spouse or boyfriend.2 Unquestionably,
poverty causes stress. Men in lower income brackets lack economic
choices, which in turn increases their frustration and tendency to-
ward violence. 2 These men often feel force is the only alternative in
facing intrafamilial conflict. As one writer noted:
Lower-class people have less prestige, money, and power, and consequently
they suffer greater frustration and bitterness. They can make fewer deci-
sions that do not depend upon their friends or spouses. They generally com-
mand fewer resources with which to achieve their aims . . . . Receiving less
respect during the day from their experiences outside the home, they have
less ability to withstand hurt and frustration in the home. 28
While battering is not exclusively a lower-income phenomenon, ex-
treme physical violence is much more common among poorer seg-
ments of the population." Similarly, unemployment of the batterer
often precipitates domestic violence.2 5 Specifically, unemployed men
are more likely to beat their wives. 6 Unemployment and its com-
mensurate financial burdens contribute to stress and thus increase
the threat of violence. 7
Certain environmental factors are also predictive of battering.
The adage "violence begets violence" can, in some cases, help ex-
plain the cause of domestic violence.2 8 Straus concluded that chil-
dren learn patterns of violence in the home, either by witnessing
violence between their parents or by being the victims of physical
19. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 143.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 148; Holden, Comment, supra note 16, at 708.
22. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 207.
23. William J. Goode, Force and Violence in the Family. 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 624, 633
(1971).
24. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 148.
25. Id. at 150.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 150-51.
28. Id. at 121-22; Robert Geffner & Alan Rosenbaum, Characteristics and Treatment of Bat-
terers, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 131, 132 (1990); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases:
The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 63
(1984).
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violence themselves.29 Those children who are unfortunate enough to
end up on both the witnessing and the receiving end of violence
often grow up to be the most violent offenders: 0
About one out of every four people who grew up in these most violent house-
holds use at least some physical force on their spouses in any one year ...
[O]ne out of ten of the husbands who grew up in violent families are wife
beaters in the sense of serious assault. This is over three times the rate for
husbands who did not grow up in such violent homes.8'
The following real example is illustrative:
Craig doesn't remember now why he did it. He only knows he hit Patsy with
the cane, the cane he had just bought. . . . He stood over her in a bedroom
of her mother's house in the Bronx, raised the cane over his head and let it
come down on her arms and hands.8'
While in treatment, Craig admitted:
I was a product of seeing my mother being beaten up. I also was beaten up,
whipped with a belt. I thought once that maybe my mother died to get out
of that relationship with my father. I mean, I know she died of cancer, but
... . That's the ironic part: I remember wanting to dial the police when
they were arguing to protect her, and yet it's funny how I did the same
thing as my father."
Clinical and empirical research also suggests that male batterers
share common personality traits.34 Such findings are important in
discussing the treatment of batterers s and in assessing the effective-
ness of legislation. Although the bulk of data available is clinical in
nature (and thus does not provide hard statistics), it consistently
supports the presence of certain personality traits in batterers, and is
generally validated by existing empirical research. 6
29. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 122; Lerman, supra note 28, at 63; Holden, Comment,
supra note 16, at 707.
30. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 122.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 98 (citation omitted).
34. Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra. note 13, at 139. For a general description of spouse
abusers, see BARBARA STAR, HELPING THE ABUSER: INTERVENING EFFECTIVELY IN FAMILY VIO-
LENCE 34-35 (1983).
35. Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 139-40.
36. Id. at 139. A number of empirical studies have been documented. See, e.g., Margaret El-
bow, Theoretical Considerations of Violent Marriages, 58 SOCIAL CASEWORK 515-26 (1977)
(noting four personality patterns commonly found in abusers); Laura Wetzel & Mary Anne Ross,
Psychological and Social Ramifications of Battering: Observations Leading to a Counseling
Methodology for Victims of Domestic Violence, 61 PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J. 423, 424-25
(1983) (noting 11 traits commonly observed in men who batter).
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Typically, men 'who batter exhibit extreme dependence on their
wives or girlfriends, often resorting to threats and abuse in order to
forestall being abandoned. A fear of intimacy is also commonly
found among batterers; the batterer is often afraid of getting close
to people and experiences difficulty expressing affection.38 Moreover,
empirical results based on administration of the Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory test show that batterers score signifi-
cantly higher than nonbatterers on the "paranoia" scale, indicating
that they are highly suspicious of their partners.3 9 Clinical reports
are corroborative, suggesting that batterers exhibit higher-than-nor-
mal levels of possessiveness and jealousy. 0
Clinicians typically describe batterers as men who have "an ex-
cessive need to be in control. They do not allow their wives to make
any independent decisions, and they want to know everything that
their wives do."14 1 Batterers are also consistently described as having
low self-esteem, as feeling powerless to control their lives, and as
being atypically anxious and depressed.42 Common among men who
batter is a history of aggression towards women; between 44 to 67
percent of the men in treatment programs each year have abused a
partner in a prior relationship.43 Moreover, "Whether batterers feel
remorse - or even are capable of doing so - is doubtful."'
Rather, the "honeymoon" period which often follows an episode of
abuse45 more likely results from the man's fear of losing his partner
37. Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 140.
38. Id. at 141.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 142. Furthermore, data suggests that the victim's challenge to the man's authority
often provides the catalyst for an attack. Id.
42. Id. at 143.
43. Id. at 144.
44. Id. at 145.
45. Michael Steinman outlined the three phases typically seen in an incident of domestic
violence:
The first or tension-building phase may include assaults but is marked chiefly by an-
gry threats and insults. Victims typically react to it by trying to calm or avoid offend-
ers. Such efforts may work initially but become less effective with time. Early suc-
cesses often mislead victims into thinking they can defuse men's anger.
Unchecked tension grows and finally bursts into a phase of uncontrolled verbal and
physical abuse that stuns and confuses victims. Injuries, when they occur, are usually
inflicted at this time. The last phase [the "honeymoon period"] is one of contrition.
Expressing surprise at their own behavior, offenders apologize, express their love, and
try to convince victims they will stop being violent.
Michael Steinman, Lowering Recidivism Among Men Who Batter Women, 17 J. POLICE SCI. &
ADMIN. 124, 124 (1990).
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than from a genuine sense of guilt or contrition."
The batterer's suspicion and possessiveness often result in the vic-
tim's isolation from society. 7 The abuser develops power and con-
trol over the victim by isolating her from friends, family, and com-
munity - the woman's traditional support network. 8 As a result,
the victim feels she cannot leave because she has nowhere to go and
no one to turn to."' As one commentator explains, batterers "at-
tempt to isolate the woman in the home, cut her off from friends or
family. Jealousy colors their thoughts and fills their minds with sus-
picions of what she is doing when he is not at home."50 In addition
to providing the batterer with control over the victim, this isolation
also serves to cut the victim off from people who would reinforce for
her that such violence is inappropriate.5
In light of the panoply of personality traits accompanying bat-
tering, it seems curious that some batterers are described as "nice,
humorous, charming, and sensitive."52 Clinicians note, however, that
a Jekyll and Hyde phenomenon often characterizes these men.5 Al-
though abusive in his intimate relationships, the batterer may inter-
act (at least seemingly) normally in more superficial relationships.5 4
These characteristics, both demographic and psychological, begin
to sketch a picture of who the batterer is and why he resorts to
physical violence.
B. Why Batter?
Economists have long argued that most, if not all, human behav-
ior is rational.55 They contend that people commit crimes because
they believe that the benefits of the crime outweigh the threat of
punishment.6
46. Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 145.
47. Steinman, supra note 45, at 124.
48. Joyce McCarl Nielson et al., Social Isolation and Wife Abuse: A Research Report, in
INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 49, 58 (Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992).
49. Steinman, supra note 45, at 124.
50s. STAR, supra note 34, at 34.
51. Nielson et al., supra note 48, at 58.
52. Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 146.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Alan Wertheimer, Criminal Justice and Public Policy: Statistical Lives and Prisoners' Di-
lemmas, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 730, 736 (1981).
56. Id. Economists also argue that if the costs of crime are increased, the demand (commission)
will decrease commensurately. This is based on a model of price elasticity. Id. at 737.
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Social scientists tend to agree with this cost/benefit analysis, lead-
ing to the conclusion that men beat women because they can. 7 This
sociological theory, termed the "Exchange Theory," holds that so-
cial interaction is shaped by "the pursuit of rewards and the avoid-
ance of punishment and costs." 8 It posits that "people abuse other
people because the costs of doing so do not outweigh the rewards." 9
More specifically, in the context of domestic violence, abuse occurs
because the consequences of beating a wife or girlfriend are not high
enough to offset the rewards. Richard Gelles suggests that: (1) men
are more likely to use violence in the home when they expect that
the costs associated with their behavior will be less than the re-
wards; (2) that the absence of effective social controls decrease the
costs of domestic violence; and (3) that typically male-dominated
social and family structures reduce social control in male/female
relationships and lessen the cost of violence by men against
women. 60 Proponents of the Exchange Theory contend that spouse
abuse occurs because victims cannot - and society does not - pun-
ish the offenders. 61
57. See, e.g., Richard J. Gelles, An Exchange/Social Control Theory, in THE DARK SIDE OF
FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 151-57 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983)
(noting that the notion that "people hit and abuse other family members because they can" is
central to the exchange theory). The commission of a crime does not always appear to be rational.
When intense emotions lead to the commission of a crime, it could be argued that the emotional
release provides a great enough "benefit" that the threat of recrimination is not enough to provoke
a more rational response.
58. Id.; see also F. Ivan Nye, Choice, Exchange. and the Family, in 2 CONTEMPORARY THEO-
RIES ABOUT THE FAMILY: GENERAL THEORIES/THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS 1 (Wesley R. Burr et
al. eds., 1979) (discussing the application of the Exchange Theory to family dynamics); F. Ivan
Nye, Is Choice and Exchange Theory the Key?, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 219 (1978) (explaining
and describing the Exchange Theory); Steinman, supra note 45, at 125 (noting that the Exchange
Theory is useful in explaining domestic violence).
59. Humphreys & Humphreys, supra note 3, at 271.
60. Gelles, supra note 57, at 158.
61. Steinman, supra note 45, at 125. A number of other theories have been advanced to further
explain why domestic violence occurs. The "Resource Theory" asserts that because men hold
higher-paying and more prestigious positions in society, they have more control in marital rela-
tionships. Emilio C. Viano, Violence Among Intimates: Major Issues and Approaches, in INTI-
MATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 3, 8-10 (Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992). As a
consequence, women are left in subordinate and vulnerable positions. Id. at 8. The "Social Learn-
ing Theory" maintains that violence is learned by children, and it stresses the intergenerational
transmission of family violence, when children who have been witnesses to or victims of abuse
become abusers in their adult relationships. Id. The "General Systems Theory" maintains that
family violence is the outcome of a social system propelled by positive feedback, and stresses the
implicit legitimization of violence between intimates. Id. at 10.
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C. Deterrence - Is it Attainable?
Two competing schools of thought have developed regarding the
effectiveness of punishment on subsequent behavior. The deterrence
theory suggests that punishment deters people from repeating the
crimes for which they were punished.62 Theorists contend that a
number of factors are requisites for effective deterrence." First,
they argue that the certainty and severity of punishment maximizes
deterrence.64 Although the probability or certainty of punishment is
important, 65 it is generally agreed that the effectiveness of deter-
rence "depends more on the perception of certainty than on the ob-
jective reality of certainty."6 6 The severity of punishment is also im-
portant, but works in tandem with certainty; that is, certainty must
be high enough to make the severity factor salient.67 Finally, they
believe that to achieve effective deterrence, society's threatened pun-
ishment must be both credible and communicated.68 The target of-
fenders must be convinced that society can and will exact punish-
ment.69  Moreover, communication of the rationale behind
punishment can improve deterrence, even if certainty and severity
are lower than desired, by alerting the offenders that their behavior
is considered wrong and is therefore being targeted. °
Criminal deterrence theorists rely on the premise of the economic
and Exchange Theory models: that most human behavior is ra-
tional.71 Deterrence theory further suggests that punishment serves
two functions: general deterrence and specific deterrence.72 General
deterrence is accomplished by sending a message to all of society
that it is wrong to behave in certain ways, and that punishment will
62. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261, 261 (1984).
63. Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 DIcK. L. REV.
1, 2 (1983).
64. Kennedy, supra note 63, at 4.
65. Id. at 5; see also GRAEME NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT RESPONSE 242 (1978) (documenting
the inverse relationship between deterrence and certainty of punishment); David F, Fisher, Note,
Creative Punishment: A Study of Effective Sentencing Alternatives, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 57 (1975)
(discussing the importance of certainty of punishment).
66. Kennedy, supra note 63, at 5.
67. Id. at 4-5.
68. Id. at 5-6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. at 1; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law
Enforcement for the Exercise of Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 83, 93 (1984).
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result if a person behaves in one of those ways.7 a The intended effect
of the punishment is on society as a whole, not on the individual
actor.7 Proponents of general deterrence also contend that punish-
ment has a moralizing effect on society; people come to believe the
behavior is wrong because it is illegal and will result in
punishment. 5
However, punishment for the purpose of specific deterrence fo-
cuses on the individual who has committed the crime.76 The goal is
to teach a lesson and discourage the wrongdoer from committing
more criminal acts.7 7 The effectiveness of specific deterrence is gen-
erally measured by the amount of recidivism on the part of the spe-
cific criminal.7 8 Moreover, even when future behavior is not af-
fected, punishment may still prevent some crime simply by
separating the actor from society for a certain amount of time.7 9
Some theorists, however, disagree that punishment serves as a
specific deterrent. They argue that punishment does not deter future
crime, but instead actually predisposes the individual criminal to
commit more crimes.80 This "labeling" theory suggests that punish-
ment may increase recidivism by altering the way the offender sees
himself and how he interacts with others.81 According to the label-
ing theory, once an offender is branded a criminal, he will act in
accordance with that label and engage in future criminal deviance.82
Neither the deterrence nor the labeling theory has consistently
proven accurate in empirical research, which suggests that punish-
ment may engender different effects in different circumstances.83 It
is important, therefore, to analyze the myriad of societal responses
to battering in light of both their possible deterrent or labeling
effects.
73. Kennedy, supra note 63, at 3.
74. Wertheimer, supra note 55, at 735.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 734.
77. Id.
78. See id. (explaining that the goal of specific deterrence is to stop criminals from committing
future crimes); see also Reiss, supra note 72, at 94 (arguing that offenders are deterred because
they seek to minimize loss and maximize gain).
79. Wertheimer, supra note 55, at 734-35.
80. Sherman & Berk, supra note 62, at 261.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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II. THE SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO BATTERING
Historically, American society in general - and the legal system
in particular - has condoned wife abuse.84 Although legal repudia-
tion of abuse began to appear in case law in the mid- to late
1800s,8 5 protection for women has nonetheless been slow in com-
ing.8 6 Until the late 1970s - a full century later - batterers were
almost never prosecuted, and laws against domestic violence were
rarely enforced."7
Similarly, society did not recognize spousal abuse as a problem
until the mid-1970s.88 This recognition can be traced to two impor-
tant factors: the women's movement in the United States and the
work of Erin Pizzey in England.89 Wife abuse emerged as a
women's issue in the late 1960s as women's groups "accidentally"
discovered the common problem of violence in their homes. 0 In
1974, the National Organization of Women ("NOW") made bat-
tered wives a priority issue in the United States and began a politi-
cal battle to improve social services and legal redress for battered
women.9' NOW and other feminist organizations set out to docu-
ment and publicize the issue of domestic violence and to define the
limitations of the existing legal and social supports available to
victims.92
Changes in the United States were paralleled by the work of ac-
84. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, I Miss. (I Walker) 156, 158 (1824) (permitting a man to physi-
cally chastise his wife), overruled by Harris v. State, 14 So. 266 (1894); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C.
(Phil. Law) 291, 291 (1868) (holding that a husband's violence would have been battery if the
victim were not his wife); State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 263, 263 (1864) (stating that the law
would not interfere with a man's right to physically punish his wife). But see THE LAW OF Do-
MESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 306 (Homer H. Clark, Jr., ed., 1988) (arguing that
there is little primary authority to support the contention that the common law encouraged family
violence).
85. See Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 148 (Ala. 1871) (stating that husband and wife "may
be indicted for assault and battery upon each other").
86. See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Conn. 1984) (providing a
detailed synthesis of the history of spouse abuse).
87. Barbara K. Finesmith, Police Repose to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals for
Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 80 (1983).
88. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
89. Id. at 10-11.
90. ld. In discussing other topics relevant to women's issues, many women discovered that
others shared the secret of domestic abuse. Id.
91. Id. at 11.
92. Jeffrey Fagan, Contributions of Research to Criminal Justice Policy on Wife Assault, in
FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 53, 56-57 (Douglas J. Besharov ed.,
1990).
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tivist Erin Pizzey in England, who established the first shelter for
abused women.93 Pizzey championed a political drive in England to
obtain better services for women who took refuge in her shelter.94 In
1974, Pizzey also authored the first major work in the field, Scream
Quietly or the Neighbors Will Hear, heralding the birth of a body
of literature on the subject of domestic violence."
A. The Response of Law Enforcement
Law enforcement has been subject to a barrage of criticism for its
response to domestic violence.96 Police response has traditionally
been characterized by the "'unschooled discretion' of officers at the
scene" 97 and nonenforcement policies in domestic violence cases.9 8
The following scenario is illustrative:
Police officers are dispatched to a home at 10:30 p.m. on a Saturday night.
The officers are met at the door by an angry woman who is bleeding from
the nose. She is extremely agitated and is swearing at the police to get her
husband out of the house. The woman explains that her husband hit her
because she yelled at him for spending the grocery money. He admits to
having hit her, but only after listening to her yell at him "for twenty solid
minutes." Both the man and the woman see her behavior as, at least par-
tially, having caused the assault. 99
Rather than arresting the husband for the assault, the officers assess
the situation and decide that:
It does not appear that the woman is in immediate danger. The officers talk
to both parties until they are calm and ask the man to leave the house for
the evening. The man agrees to go to a friend's house. The officers have
separated the parties and presumably prevented an escalation of the
violence.'00
The question of what will happen when the husband returns the
next day, however, is ignored.
The justification for nonintervention is rooted, in part, in society's
historical perception of domestic violence. The idea that "a man's
93. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 11.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 162; see Ellen Pence, The Duluth Domestic Abuse Interven-
tion Project, 6 HAMLINE L. REv. 247, 247-49 (1983) (describing the reluctance of police to help
the victim in wife abuse cases).
97. Pence, supra note 96, at 248.
98. Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 162.
99. Pence, supra note 96, at 252.
100. Id.
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home is his castle," along with the desire to avoid infringing on a
couple's private relationship and a fear of the adverse economic im-
pact an arrest can have on a family unit have been used by police to
justify nonenforcement. 101 The privacy argument, though firmly en-
trenched, has been rejected by the courts. 102 Similarly, the economic
detriment justification is weakened by the fact that society does not
oppose the arrest of other types of criminals on economic grounds.103
B. The Response of Prosecutors
Prosecutorial response, characterized by low prosecution rates and
high dismissal rates,10 has also garnered harsh criticism. 05 Prose-
cutors often avoid prosecuting domestic abuse cases, believing them
to be "family matters" which do not belong in court.106 As a result,
many prosecutors have failed to treat domestic violence seriously.07
Compounding this reluctance to prosecute has been the concomitant
reluctance of women to follow through with charges, which, admit-
tedly, impedes the ability of the prosecutor to get a conviction.10 8
Ellen Pence, director of the domestic intervention pilot program in
Duluth, Minnesota, suggests that in cases of domestic violence, the
abuser, through coercion, promises, or emotional ties, uses the vic-
tim to shield himself from the legal system.' 09 However, the typical
prosecutorial response - dropping cases where the woman is hesi-
tant to follow through - places the responsibility of pursuing the
101. Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 162.
102. For example, a number of cases have held that marital rape exemptions are unconstitu-
tional. E.g. Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); People v. M.D., 595
N.E.2d 702 (II1. App. Ct. 1992); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1020 (1985). Other courts, however, have held similar marital rape exemptions constitu-
tional. E.g. People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 803 (1982);
State v. Taylor, 726 S.2d 335 (Mo. 1987).
103. Montalto, Note, supra note 9, at 344.
104. Mary Haviland, Director of the Coalition for Criminal Justice Reform for Battered
Women, estimates that less than ten domestic violence cases a year actually go to trial in New
York City. Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 167 n.119 (citation omitted).
105. Pence, supra note 96, at 248-49.
106. Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 166.
107. For example, Denise Markham of the Domestic Violence Advocacy Project in Chicago,
Illinois, estimated that in 1987, about 90 percent of the domestic violence cases in Cook County
were charged as misdemeanors, regardless of the severity of the injuries. Id. at 166-67. Similarly,
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, out of 8,000 misdemeanor arrests for domestic violence last year, only
50 percent were prosecuted, and of those prosecuted only 30 percent were found guilty. World
News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, June 27, 1994).
108. Id. at 167; Pence, supra note 96, at 250.
109. Pence, supra note 96, at 250.
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charge on the victim, and often results in inaction."'
To combat the reluctance of prosecutors to take domestic violence
cases to trial, some jurisdictions have experimented with "no-drop"
prosecutorial policies which deter prosecutors from foregoing prose-
cution.'11 If strictly enforced, however, such policies can harm the
woman more than they help her. For example, under such a policy a
woman could either be arrested or forced to pay court costs for fail-
ing to testify against her partner."' As a result,.strict no-drop poli-
cies have been criticized for discouraging victims from initially com-
ing forward." s
C. The Response of the Judiciary
The judicial response to battering has been equally criticized." 4
Even if the police and prosecutorial hurdles are surpassed, victims
often face judges who do not take domestic violence seriously and
are reluctant to send batterers to jail."' Judges often assume that
the victim provoked the batterer or that the victim is abusing the
court system by using it to resolve a family quarrel," 6 and they
often release even repeat offenders on minimal or no bail." 7 In those
cases where a batterer is convicted, judges routinely do not impose a
sentence, but merely lecture the defendant and warn him that next
time the judge will "throw the book" at him." 8
110. See Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMAN BAT-
TERING: POLICY RESPONSES 95, 101 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991) (discussing the role of prosecu-
tors in stopping domestic violence).
111. Pence, supra note 96, at 260.
112. Cahn & Lerman, supra note 110, at 101 (CHECK THIS CITE!).
113. See id. Prosecutors in Brooklyn, New York, will allow victims to drop charges, but only
after the victim has met with a counselor. Id. In Madison, Wisconsin, prosecutors will proceed
without the cooperation of victims. World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, June 27,
1994).
114. Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 169-70.
115. Id. A particularly glaring example occurred in Massachusetts. In 1986, District Court
Judge Paul Heffernan admonished complainant Pamela Dunn for wasting his time in court on a
domestic violence matter. Although he granted her protective order, he refused to order increased
protection. Pamela's husband subsequently kidnapped, shot, stabbed, and strangled her, and left
her body in the town dump. Court Challenged in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1986, at
A6 1.
116. Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 170.
117. Id. n.139 (citation omitted).
118. Raymond I. Parnas, Judicial Response to Intra-Family Violence, 54 MINN. L. REv. 585,
598-99 (1970).
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III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO BATTERING
The public concern surrounding the issue of domestic violence,
and public dissatisfaction with how domestic violence has been
treated, has led to legislative action." 9 The initial legislative re-
sponse in many states has been to allow victims to obtain protective
orders12 0  and to establish emergency shelters and other support
services. 12
1
Protective orders are enforceable in criminal courts. 2 2 Such an
order directs the batterer to stay away from the home or victim and
to refrain from further abusive conduct. 23 Legislators hoped that
these protective orders would make a strong statement to abusers -
that courts believe victims deserve protection - and that they
would therefore deter future assaults.124
However, a host of pragmatic problems have accompanied the is-
suance and enforcement of protective orders. 12 5 Access to protective
orders is limited by the victim's unfamiliarity with the system, and
the remedy is often discouraged by prosecutors and judges . 26 Vic-
tims are also deterred by the length of time - often months - that
it can take to obtain such an order. 27 For those victims who persist
and eventually obtain a protective order, its efficacy is further re-
duced by the reluctance of law enforcement officers to arrest batter-
119. Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 152.
120. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6240-57 (West Special Pamphlet 1994) (describing the issuance
of protective orders); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (1991) (allowing victims to obtain protec-
tive orders in domestic abuse cases).
121. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-7.5-101 to -105 (West 1990) (repealed 1995) (en-
couraging the development of local domestic abuse programs); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:14-1 to -14
(West 1981) (encouraging the development of shelters for victims of domestic abuse). See Litsky,
Note, supra note 10, at 153 (stating that the most common legislative response has been to enact
a law allowing for protective orders and the establishment of shelters).
122. See Mary Lou Boland, Note, Domestic Violence: Illinois Responds to the Plight of the
Battered Wife - The Illinois Domestic Violence Act, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 77, 90 (1982)
(discussing protective orders in Illinois).
123. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994) (requiring a defend-
ant to stay away from the person or premise or to refrain from verbal or physical violence).
124. See Greg Anderson, Note, Sorichetti v. City of New York Tells The Police That Liability
Looms for Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence Situations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333 (1985)
(discussing a case which held that a protective order creates a "special relationship" between the
protected party and the police, thereby providing the basis for police liability if the protected party
is injured).
125. Pence, supra note 96, at 267.
126. Lisa R. Beck, Note, Protecting Battered Women: A Proposal for Comprehensive Domes-
tic Violence Legislation in New York, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1014 (1987).
127. Id. n.87.
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ers for violating the order, 1 8 and by the reluctance of judges to
sanction such violations. 29 As a result, protective orders have
proved grossly inadequate in preventing domestic violence.130
A. Arrest Policies
Arrest signifies to an offender "that his behavior is a crime, that it
must stop, that punishment will follow, and that it is sensible to
secure treatment to avoid repeating the behavior." 131 Specifically, in
situations of domestic violence, the aim of arrest policies is to in-
crease the costs associated with battering:
Arrest imposes the most costs and no formal action imposes the fewest. The
costs imposed by arrest include a brief time in jail or the chance of it and
the possibility of being prosecuted and suffering court-mandated penalties
like a fine or a jail term. Arrest may also trigger indirect costs for offenders
such as humiliation, divorce or separation from their partners, and loss of
job. 182
Failure to arrest, on the other hand, sends the opposite message:
Men . . .[get] the message from police officers that woman battering is not
a crime and that the sanctions of the criminal justice system - sanctions
which presumably exist to deter and punish those who have the inclination
to behave in antisocial ways - are routinely not invoked by police officers
and that therefore they have nothing to fear if they beat the women with
whom they are, or were, involved.'88
The deterrence potential of arrest has led to increased scrutiny of
arrest policies as well as a search for the proper balance (if any)
between total police discretion on the one hand and no police discre-
tion on the other.
1. Permissive Arrest Policies
Many states have adopted permissive arrest or warrantless arrest
policies which allow police to make an arrest without a warrant if
128. Id. at 1015.
129. Id.
130. See Litsky, Note, supra note 10, at 155 (stating that state legislative response to domestic
violence in the 1970s was "grossly inadequate").
131. Anthony Bouza, Responding to Domestic Violence, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RE-
SPONSES 191, 195 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991).
132. Michael Steinman, Coordinated Criminal Justice Interventions and Recidivism Among
Batterers, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 221, 222 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991).
133. Eva Jefferson Paterson, How the Legal System Responds to Battered Women, in BAT-
TERED WOMEN 79. 82-83 (Donna M. Moore ed.. 1979).
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they have probable cause, often in cases where the offense is deemed
a misdemeanor."" These statutes preserve police discretion in decid-
ing whether to make an arrest. Permissive arrest policies typically
provide that the police may make a warrantless arrest in certain
circumstances. 135  The Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986
("Act") 13 typifies how such permissive arrest policies are codified.
The Act contains a permissive arrest provision which allows police
to effectuate a warrantless arrest if an abuser violates a protective
order,3 7 or upon probable cause that a crime has been commit-
ted.'38 In cases where the police, at their discretion, opt not to arrest
the abuser, the Act requires that the police file a report and inform
the victim of her right to initiate criminal action.' 3 9
134. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030(b) (Supp. 1993) (permitting warrantless arrest when
a spouse is the victim); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (Supp. 1994) (permitting warrant-
less arrest upon probable cause for commission of a felony or misdemeanor domestic violence);
FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 901.15(6), (7)(a) (Harrison 1985 & Supp. 1993) (permitting warrantless
arrest upon probable cause for violation of a domestic violence protective order, battery upon a
spouse with evidence of bodily harm, or the potential for further violence); IDAHO CODE § 19-
603(6) (Supp. 1993) (permitting warrantless arrest if there is reasonable cause to believe the
person has assaulted their spouse); 750 ILCS § 60/301 (1994) (permitting warrantless arrest for
a crime if there is probable cause, including but not limited to a violation of a protective order);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West Supp. 1993) (permitting warrantless arrest upon
probable cause for felony or misdemeanor domestic violence, or a violation of a restraining order);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2) (1993) (permitting warrantless arrest upon probable cause for
domestic abuse or an assault upon a family or household member); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-29-
3(B), 15-15-5(A) (Supp. 1993) (permitting warrantless arrest upon probable cause for a felony or
misdemeanor when a failure to arrest could result in nonapprehension of the offender or further
violence).
135. Pro-arrest policies, on the other hand, provide that the police should make arrests in cer-
tain instances; mandatory arrest policies state that the police must or shall make arrests in certain
situations. See infra notes 143-82 and accompanying text (discussing pro-arrest and mandatory
arrest policies).
136. 750 ILCS §§ 60/101-305 (West 1993 & Supp. 1993). The Act, inter alia, clarifies who is
protected and defines what types of conduct constitute abuse. Id. §§ 103, 201. The Act outlines
six major purposes:
1) recognizing that domestic violence is a serious crime;
2) recognizing adults with disabilities as high risk persons susceptible to domestic
violence;
3) recognizing that law enforcement has not effectively dealt with domestic violence;
4) supporting victims by issuing protective orders and by addressing issues of custody
and support;
5) clarifying the role of law enforcement; and
6) expanding the civil and criminal remedies available to victims.
Id. § 102(1)-(6). Furthermore, the Act specifically provides for the issuance of protective orders.
Id. § 214.
137. 750 ILCS § 60/301(a) (West 1993).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 304(7)(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1993).
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Critics of permissive arrest laws maintain that legislation such as
that enacted by Illinois 14 0 does not go far enough in protecting
women, since it still allows the police to use discretion at the scene.
Consider the following cases:141
Case #0101: A woman called the police. Her husband had beaten her and
broken all the windows in the house. Police arrived and told her she had
better find somewhere else to stay. The husband pushed the woman several
times in front of the police, yet they did not intervene or arrest him.
Case #0243: A man threw a woman out of a window, causing injuries that
required stitches. Police were called to the house by neighbors. The respond-
ing officers were friends of the man and joked around with him. The officers
arrested the woman and charged her with disturbing the peace." 2
2. Pro-Arrest Policies
Unlike permissive arrest statutes which merely allow the police
latitude to make an arrest, pro-arrest or preferred arrest policies
suggest that arrests be made in certain circumstances.1 4 3 These poli-
cies, however, also preserve some level of police discretion in deter-
mining whether a particular case fits within those circumstances. It
is asserted that pro-arrest laws - which attempt to limit the exer-
cise of police discretion - offer more protection to victims than
wholly discretionary (or permissive) arrest systems, and in fact serve
to deter batterers. 1"
3. Mandatory Arrest Policies
Mandatory arrest legislation, on the other hand, presupposes the
notion that police discretion must be completely alleviated in order
to curb the problem of domestic violence. In 1981, Duluth, Minne-
sota became the first jurisdiction to enact a mandatory arrest policy
for misdemeanor assaults.145 This served to radically alter the typi-
cal domestic violence scenario:
140. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (describing the Illinois Domestic Abuse
Statute).
141. Although real, these cases are not held out as typical incidents of domestic violence, but
serve to illustrate the possible effects of complete police discretion at the scene.
142. Sarah Mausolff Buel, Recent Developments: Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, II
HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 211, 213-14 (1988) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
143. J. David Hirschel & Ira Hutchinson, Police-Preferred Arrest Policies, in WOMAN BAT-
TERING: POLICY REsPONSEs 49, 52 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991).
144. Buel, supra note 142, at 215-16.
145. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 23.
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1:02 A.M.: Couple arguing loudly. Probably just "verbal assault," the dis-
patcher tells the car patrols.
1:06 A.M.: Two squad cars pull up to the address. A tall blond man opens
the door as a naked woman hurriedly slips on a raincoat. The man looks
calm. The woman looks anything but.
"We were just having a squabble," he begins.
"He was kicking the crap out of me," she yells ....
How does he explain the blood oozing from the inside of her mouth? "She
drinks, you know. She probably cut herself." From inside the bedroom,
Jenny M., whose face is puffing up screams: "Just get him out of here! And
then you guys leave, too!" ...
"She lies, you know," George G. confides to an officer, who remains stone-
faced. Jenny M. starts crying again. "I don't want him hurt. This is my
fault. I'm the drinker. He's not a bad guy ....
Then the police head toward George G. with handcuffs. He looks at her
beseechingly. "Jenny, do you want me to go?"
An officer cuts him short. "George, it's not her choice."
George G. thrusts his chin out and his fists deep into the couch. "But this
is just a domestic fight!"
One cop replies: "We don't have a choice either. We have to arrest
you."
146
Police discretion in this situation is noticeably absent. Under a
mandatory arrest law, police officers must recognize the altercation
as an assault and arrest the assailant. They are not allowed to place
responsibility for initiating the arrest on the victim.
The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project ("DAIP") ex-
emplifies a fully integrated project, establishing mandatory arrest
policies coupled with police training, prosecutorial and judicial
guidelines, support services for victims, and rehabilitation and coun-
seling for batterers. 147 The program was initiated under the premise
that "the institutions within our society must take the responsibility
to end battering. Holding assailants accountable for their use of vio-
lence gives the community, victims, assailants and children a clear
message that battering is not acceptable 'even' within the confines of
the family." '148 Ellen Pence, founder and director of DAIP, high-
lighted the program's dual accomplishments: "[T]he program offers
safety for victims while providing abusers with clear limits on their
behavior, certain intervention, and a more systematic program for
the purpose of changing their behavior.
146. Id.
147. Pence, supra note 96, at 255-69.
148. Id. at 254.
149. Id.
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Initial evaluation of the Duluth program showed remarkable suc-
cess. 150 For example, 77 percent of those arrested for misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence pled guilty,151 and the number of repeat
offenses reported dropped significantly. 152 Pence detailed the reasons
for DAIP's success: "It has shifted the focus of intervention from
the victim to the assailant. In doing so, it has enhanced the ability
of the system to deter assailants by increasing the numbers of assail-
ants convicted of assault and establishing serious consequences for
battering."' 3 This alters the perception that domestic violence is
merely a dysfunctional relationship and recognizes that it is a crimi-
nal one.'5 Proponents of the Duluth project argue that it changes
the cost/benefit equation by increasing the costs of battering and
thus deters recidivism.' 55
Mandatory arrest legislation did not garner widespread attention,
however, until 1984, when results from the landmark Minneapolis
Domestic Violence Experiment were published. 56 In an empirical
field experiment with the Minneapolis Police Department, Profes-
sors Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk studied the deterrent ef-
fect of arrest on domestic violence.15 7 They found that arrest was
the most effective deterrent to repeat incidents of battering, 58 and
that arrest did not, as the labeling theory 59 predicted, increase
recidivism.' 60
150. Id. at 257-58.
151. Id. at 257.
152. Id. at 258. "Police had prior contact with 73% of the assailants before an arrest was
made, 38 % in the six months following the arrest, and only 16 % from the seven to twelve months
after arrest." Id.
153. Id. at 269.
154. Id.
155. Buel, supra note 142, at 216.
156. The experiment and its results are described in Sherman & Berk, supra note 62, at 261;
Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy: The Minne-
apolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & Soc. REV. 117, 117-19 (1989); Beck, Note,
supra note 126, at 1015-16.
157. Sherman & Berk, supra note 62, at 261.
158. The study's methodology included the following:
The behavior of the suspect was tracked for six months after the police intervention,
with both official data and victim reports. The official recidivism measures show that
the arrested suspects manifested significantly less subsequent violence than those who
were ordered to leave. The victim report data show that the arrested subjects mani-
fested significantly less subsequent violence than those who were advised.
Id.
159. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (explaining the labeling theory of
punishment).
160. Sherman & Berk, supra note 62, at 261 (stating that "[t]he findings falsify a deviance
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The policy response to the Minneapolis Experiment has been dra-
matic. On the heels of its findings, a number of states and munici-
palities enacted mandatory arrest statutes.16  Such statutes 162 pro-
vide that the police shall arrest the abuser in certain defined
circumstances, as opposed to permissive arrest policies which pro-
vide that the police may arrest, 163 and pro-arrest policies which dic-
tate that the police should arrest. 64 Proponents argue that
mandatory arrest laws send a message to the victim that society
does not blame her for her predicament. The intent behind such
statutes is two-fold: to protect the victim, and to deter subsequent
amplification model of labeling theory beyond initial labeling, and fail to falsify the specific deter-
rence prediction for a group of offenders with a high percentage of prior histories of both domestic
violence and other kinds of crime").
161. See Richard A. Berk & Phyllis J. Newton, Does Arrest Really Deter Wife Battery? An
Effort to Replicate the Findings of the Minneapolis Spouse Abuse Experiment, 50 Am. Soc. REV.
253 (1985) (discussing changes in California law and the results of a follow-up study of residents
prone to domestic violence); Franklyn W. Dunford et al., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault:
The Omaha Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990) (noting changes in Omaha domes-
tic violence laws and the results of studies in Omaha); Beck, Note, supra note 126, at 1035-36
(suggesting revisions of domestic violence laws in New York). For examples of current mandatory
arrest statutes, see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
162. For example, Connecticut law provides that:
Whenever a peace officer determines upon speedy information that a family violence
crime ...has been committed within his jurisdiction, he shall arrest the person or
persons suspected of its commission . . . .The decision to arrest and charge shall not
(1) be dependent on the specific consent of the victim, (2) consider the relationship of
the parties or (3) be based solely on a request by the victim.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b (West Supp. 1994); see also, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031
(Supp. 1993) ("A law enforcement officer shall arrest a person if the law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that the person: (1) Committed an intrafamily offense that resulted in
physical injury. ... ); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (Supp. 1993)("[T]he officers shall make an
arrest when they have probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed or has been
committed."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.1225 (1991) (requiring officers to inform suspected victims
of acts of domestic violence that "[i]f I have probable cause to believe that an act of domestic
violence has been committed against you in the last 4 hours I am required, unless mitigating
circumstances exist, to arrest immediately the person suspected of committing the act"); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21 (West Supp. 1993) ("[T]he law enforcement officer shall arrest the per-
son who is alleged to be the person who subjected the victim to domestic violence .... ); OR.
REV. STAT. § 133.055(2)(a) (1993) (noting that "the officer shall arrest and take into custody the
alleged assailant or potential assailant"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(B) (Supp. 1993) ("When a
law enforcement officer responds to a domestic violence situation and has probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed, ... the officer shall arrest and take into custody the alleged
perpetrator [in certain situations] . "); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 94 (1991) (noting that an
officer "shall make an arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that a
misdemeanor or felony involving domestic violence . . . has been committed").
163. Beck, Note, supra note 126, at 1036; see also supra note 134 (providing examples of
permissive arrest statutes).
164. Beck, Note, supra note 126, at 1036; see also supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text
(discussing pro-arrest policies).
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offenses.16 5
Attempts to replicate the findings of the Minneapolis study, how-
ever, have cast doubt on the desirability and the feasibility of
mandatory arrest legislation. 166 For example, a similar study con-
ducted in conjunction with the Omaha Police Department 67 did not
support the findings of the Minneapolis experiment. 68 The original
Omaha report indicated that arrests did not deter domestic vio-
lence.' 69 It did suggest, however, that arrests did not necessarily
lead to subsequent incidents of violence.170
Professor Sherman, who coauthored the original Minneapolis re-
port, 17 conducted a similar study in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Unlike
the Minneapolis study, however, the results of the Milwaukee study
called into question the efficacy of mandatory arrest. 72 The Mil-
waukee study indicated that another factor - the employment sta-
tus of the batterer - had a dramatic impact on the deterrent effect
of arrest.17  Data from the Milwaukee project indicated that an ar-
rest deterred employed men from repeat violence, as evidenced by a
165. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-53-101 (Michie 1993) (noting that "immediate interven-
tion through arrest upon probable cause to protect the victim from physical injury is one remedy
which should be provided in this state as in other states"). In addition, Idaho law states that:
[T]he legislature finds that a significant number of homicides, aggravated assaults,
and assaults and batteries occur within the home between adult members of families.
• . . Domestic violence can . . . be deterred, prevented or reduced by vigorous prose-
cution by law enforcement agencies and prosecutors and by appropriate attention and
concern by the courts whenever reasonable cause exists for arrest and prosecution.
IDAHO CODE § 39-6302 notes (1993).
166. See, e.g., Dunford et al., supra note 161, at 204 (stating that "[a]rrest, and the immediate
period of custody associated with arrest, was not the deterrent to continued domestic conflict that
was expected"); Daniel Goleman, Do Arrests Increase the Rates of Repeated Domestic Violence?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at C8 (reporting no difference in the number of repeat assaults be
tween men who were arrested and those who were not); see also infra notes 168-81 and accompa-
nying text (discussing subsequent studies which were unable to replicate the Minneapolis study's
findings).
167. The Omaha Experiment was one of six similar studies funded by the National Institute of
Justice. Dunford et al., supra note 161, at 183.
168. Id. at 204.
169. Id. ("[T]he inability to replicate findings associated with the Minneapolis experiment calls
into question any generalization of the Minneapolis findings to other sites. First, arrest in Omaha,
by itself, did not appear to deter subsequent domestic conflict any more than did separating or
mediating those in conflict.").
170. Id. ("Arrest did not appear to place victims in greater danger than did separation or
mediation. It would appear that what the police did in Omaha . . . neither helped nor hurt vic-
tims in terms of subsequent conflict.").
171. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (detailing the findings of the Minneapolis
experiment).
172. Goleman, supra note 167, at C8.
173. Id. This factor was not considered in the original Minneapolis study.
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16 percent decrease in recidivism. 74  Among the unemployed, 175
however, being arrested increased repeat violence by 44 percent.176
The results forced Sherman to conclude that "mandatory arrests in
domestic violence cases may cause more violence against women in
the long run.'' 7 This is particularly disturbing since poor men are
more likely to be reported to the authorities for domestic violence
than are middle- and upper-class abusers. 78
On one level, the existence of such conflicting empirical results
highlights the danger inherent in basing policy on one empirical
study.17 9  Notably, this danger was anticipated by Sherman and
Berk in their report on the Minneapolis findings. They cautioned:
[W]e favor a presumption of arrest; an arrest should be made unless there
are good, clear reasons why an arrest would be counterproductive. We do
not, however, favor requiring arrests in all misdemeanor domestic assault
cases. Even if our findings were replicated in a number of jurisdictions, there
is a good chance that arrest works far better for some kinds of offenders
than others . . . We feel it best to leave police a loophole to capitalize on
that variation. 80
Despite their reservations, however, the results of this one study led
to the enactment of mandatory arrest legislation.' 8' On a broader
level, such results necessitate a close scrutiny of the viability of
mandatory arrest statutes, for while they may be appropriate in cer-
tain locales under specific circumstances, they do not appear to be
universally appropriate.
174. Id.
175. It is interesting to note that unemployment has been correlated to the incidence of bat-
tering. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between unem-
ployment and spouse abuse).
176. Goleman, supra note 167.
177. Id. Sherman also noted that the deterrent effect shown in Minneapolis was related to the
low unemployment rate in that city at the time the study was conducted. Id.
178. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 26; see also Roger Worthington, Value of Mandatory Arrest
for Woman Beaters Questioned, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1991, at C5 ("Mandatory arrest puts us in
the moral dilemma of reducing violence against women who are relatively well off (living with or
married to an employed assailant), at the price of increasing violence against women whose abus-
ers are unemployed.") (quoting Professor Lawrence Sherman).
179. Sherman & Cohn, supra note 156, at 117 (reporting that "over one-third of respondents
from U.S. police departments in 117 cities said their policy had been influenced by the [Minneap-
olis] experiment").
180. Sherman & Berk, supra note 62, at 270.
181. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting the mandatory arrest statutes from
various states).
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IV. MANDATORY ARREST - NOT A PANACEA FOR THE
PROBLEM
If, as most social scientists suggest, the Exchange Theory explains
why men batter, mandatory arrest must then be analyzed in light of
the costs it imposes on the batterer. 182 To effectively deter domestic
abuse, the imposition of sufficiently severe costs must be certain.
Moreover, batterers must believe that society will be able to punish
them. Finally, society must send a message to these men that they
are being punished because abusing women is not tolerable; only
then will these men stop abusing women in order to avoid punish-
ment. 83 Additionally, using arrest as a mandatory sanction signifies
to society as a whole that abuse of women is wrong and will be
punished. 8
Under the Exchange Theory, though, it is likely that only men
who have something to lose from arrest and prosecution are likely to
be deterred. For example, employed abusers have more at stake in
the community and thus more to fear from an arrest and subsequent
prosecution. Unemployed men, with less to lose, may not be de-
terred by the costs of arrest and prosecution, and in fact seem to be
more susceptible to the phenomenon of labeling.1 85 The danger is
that these men will respond to arrest by committing future acts of
violence against women.1 6
Critics assert that mandatory arrest statutes, if not implemented
in tandem with coordinated efforts, are at best minimally effective
and at worst counterproductive. Such efforts, instead, come "peril-
ously close to encouraging greater jeopardy for victims unless ac-
companied by recommendations for massive changes in
prosecutorial and judicial practices. In a judicial system which sel-
dom tries spouse abuse offenders and rarely convicts them, women
are seldom protected from violent reprisals.1' 87 As the criticism of
182. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Exchange Theory and its
application to domestic violence).
183. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing the need for the threat of pun-
ishment to be communicated to offenders in order to achieve deterrence).
184. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing general deterrence).
185. Worthington, supra note 179, at C5. ("There is more unrestrained anger in the unem-
ployed batterer because he has little to lose. If people have something to lose, they are fearful of
losing that, and that controls their anger. So they become less violent.") (quoting Professor Law-
rence Sherman).
186. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text (detailing the results of the Milwaukee
study, which showed that arrest may lead to recidivism for some offenders).
187. Sarah F. Berk & Donileen R. Loseke, "Handling" Family Violence: Situational Determi-
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prosecutors and judges suggests, 188 arrest alone is not a panacea for
the problem of abuse. In the successful Duluth experiment, a
mandatory arrest policy was augmented by a strong coordinated
community program providing prosecutorial and sentencing guide-
lines as well as counseling and support services for victims and abus-
ers.'" 9 The 47 percent decrease in recidivism could not be traced
solely to arrest, but rather to the coordinated effort of various agen-
cies.' 90 Similarly, in the Minneapolis experiment, those men who
were arrested actually served time in jail. 9' Available data begs the
question whether similar deterrent effects would be seen if the cer-
tainty and severity of a jail sentence did not exist.
Even within the scope of a coordinated program, as illustrated by
the Duluth model, recent empirical evidence raises concerns about
the wisdom of enacting mandatory arrest laws without regard for
the particular characteristics of the jurisdiction. 92 For example, a
blanket policy of mandatory arrest in Illinois would neither be wise
nor feasible. Illinois, and the Chicago urban area in particular, suf-
fer from a large unemployment problem. 9 ' Reporting trends indi-
cate that it is this disadvantaged population that will be dispropor-
tionately affected by mandatory arrest .legislation. 194  The
Milwaukee 9" and Omaha' studies suggest that arrest is counter-
productive for men who are unemployed, as it serves to increase re-
nants of Police Arrest in Domestic Disturbances, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 317, 343 (1980-81); see
also Robert E. Worden & Alissa A. Pollitz, Police Arrests in Domestic Disturbances: A Further
Look, 18 LAW & Soc'y. REV. 105, 118 (1984) (announcing support for the Berk & Loseke study
based on a replication of those findings).
188. See supra notes 104-18 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of prosecutors and
judges to adequately protect the victims of spouse abuse).
189. Pence, supra note 96, at 255.
190. Buel, supra note 142, at 216.
191. Sherman & Berk, supra note 62, at 268.
192. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text (discussing the Omaha and Milwaukee
studies, which were unable to substantiate the results of the Minneapolis experiment).
193. Estimates vary. See Christi Parsons & James Hill, Hungry North Chicago Gets Sliver of
Abbott Pie, CHI. TRIa., Sept. 23, 1992, at LI (reporting that the Chicago area had an unemploy-
ment rate in 1991 of 7.8 percent, compared to Lake County's rate of 4.7 percent); Isabel Wilker-
son, Refugees From Recession Fill Hotel's Payroll, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, at § i, at I (re-
porting that as of December 1991, the unemployment rate in Chicago was 10.3 percent, compared
to the national average of 7.1 percent).
194. See supra notes 25-27, 176-79 and accompanying text (discussing how poor men are more
likely to be reported for domestic violence, and noting that since mandatory arrests in the lower
economic class may actually increase violence, this disadvantaged population will be dispropor-
tionately affected by mandatory arrest statutes).
195. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Milwaukee study).
196. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Omaha experiment).
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cidivism and undermine the goals of mandatory arrest. The risk,
therefore, is that mandatory arrest will simply lead to more inci-
dents of domestic violence among the poor.
Mandatory arrest laws enacted independently of a coordinated
community program are doomed to fail. Unless accompanied by
prosecutorial and judicial guidelines, as well as support services for
victims, arrest has not been shown to deter further violence. 197
Moreover, by enacting mandatory arrest policies, jurisdictions
make promises to the victim: to treat the crime of abuse seriously; to
punish the offender; and, critically, to protect her. In Duluth and
Minneapolis, where punishment was certain and severe - that is,
abusers were actually incarcerated - and where abusers quickly
learned that the community was capable of exacting punishment,
those promises were kept. However, where an arrest is not accompa-
nied by at least some amount of incarceration, the victim may be
placed in an even more precarious position.'98
Whether the abuser is susceptible to the costs of battering given
his individual circumstances, and whether the abuser will spend any
time in jail following the arrest are factors which will impact
whether he will be deterred from future acts of abuse. It is unclear,
and empirically unsupported, that arrest without subsequent incar-
ceration will deter recidivism. In smaller communities where the
overcrowding of jails is not at issue, arrest and incarceration may
indeed send a message to the batterer while affording the victim
adequate time to protect herself. In urban areas, limited jail space
coupled with a reluctance to prosecute and sentence offenders make
it unlikely that batterers will face incarceration. Arguably, then, the
cost of battering would not be significantly altered, and the likeli-
hood of deterrence would be proportionately reduced.
Mandatory arrest legislation removes' police discretion in an effort
to guarantee that the costs associated with spouse abuse will be
more certain and more severe. " Removing all police discretion will
serve to inhibit archaic notions from influencing the decision to ar-
197. In 1986, Leedonycll Williams of Washington D.C. called the police to report that her ex-
boyfriend had broken into her apartment and threatened her with a gun. Her boyfriend was ar-
rested, but charges were dropped because the case was considered to be domestic violence. The
next day, Williams was shot and killed in her apartment building, and her boyfriend was subse-
quently charged with first-degree murder. Horwitz, supra note 11, at A7.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing the elimination of police dis-
cretion through the use of mandatory arrest laws).
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rest, but not without costs. Professor H. Richard Uviller argued that
curtailing police discretion is not the solution:
The solace of standardized rules and procedures is largely illusory. Rigid
rules tend to ossify individual responsibility and discourage individualistic
thinking. Those who would shrink discretion obey the precept: "Treat likes
alike." However, the overriding lesson of experience in our criminal justice
operation is that every case is different. The major worry is that the people
out there dealing with the problems will lose their appreciation of the differ-
ences between the cases and will begin reacting to them as repetitive ...
The learned fact should be that crimes and criminals emerge from a rich
variety of circumstances. Separately and in combination, the variants can
never be fully anticipated or assessed; yet they are often critical to forming
the just response.200
A variety of other criticisms of mandatory arrest statutes have
been suggested. For example, dual arrest is a problem with some
mandatory arrest laws. °1 In situations where an officer is faced with
two people who have sustained injuries and claim to be the victim,
the officers may be compelled under the terms of the statute to ar-
rest both parties.20 2 This revictimizes the woman, and reinforces the
idea that she is somehow to blame.
The dual arrest problem, however, can be alleviated by carefully
wording a mandatory arrest statute. For example, the New Jersey
statute mandates that if the officer finds that both parties exhibit
signs of injury, he should consider the comparative extent of the
injuries, the history of domestic violence (if any), and other relevant
factors.20 3 Interestingly, though, the New Jersey statute avoids dual
arrest only by relying on some modicum of officer discretion.
Finally, some critics also argue that mandating arrest against the
express wishes of the victim strips her of her autonomy.0 4 However,
protecting the victim and deterring future assaults might, arguably,
justify any loss of autonomy. These justifications ring hollow, how-
ever, in cases where the victim is not protected and deterrence is not
effectuated. It may be that the woman herself is best able to gauge
200. See H. Richard Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility Call,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 15, 32.
201. Connecticut, which has one of the nation's toughest arrest policies, has a dual arrest rate
of 14 percent. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 26.
202. Id.
203. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21c(2) (West Supp. 1993).
204. Carol Wright, Note, Immediate Arrest In Domestic Violence Situations: Mandate or Al-
ternative, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 243, 260 (1985) (noting that mandatory arrest laws, at the very
least, take decision-making power away from victims and can possibly force them to prosecute
against their wishes).
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what her partner's response will be. These critics therefore argue in
favor of allowing the officer some discretion at the scene.208
The above analysis suggests that the benefits associated with
mandatory arrest are largely illusory. In lieu of a mandatory arrest
policy, however, Illinois should consider implementing a coordinated
program which maximizes the deterrent value of an arrest by utiliz-
ing it in appropriate situations.
Pro-arrest or preferred arrest policies 206 strike a balance between
overcoming archaic notions of domestic violence and preserving
some level of needed police discretion. Although a pro-arrest policy
does not avoid all of the problems endemic to police discretion, it
does recognize the appropriateness and utility of arrest in the sphere
of domestic violence without mandating arrest in cases where the
risk to the victim would be increased. Unlike mandatory arrest poli-
cies, pro-arrest legislation allows the officer to consider the unique
situation of the batterer and the victim and to assess whether an
arrest is appropriate.
Inherent in discretion is the risk that it will be abused. Pro-arrest
policies, however, indicate to police officers that arrest is an appro-
priate and viable sanction. Ideally, officers are educated about the
seriousness of domestic abuse and are given detailed guidelines sug-
gesting when arrest would be an appropriate and effective measure.
If this is simultaneously augmented by an effort to prosecute and
sentence those offenders that are arrested, police officers will be en-
couraged to take domestic abuse seriously.
The obvious advantage a pro-arrest policy has over a mandatory
arrest statute is that' it only attempts to incarcerate batterers where
society believes the incarceration will deter. A pro-arrest policy can
maximize the impact of an arrest by reserving the sanction for seri-
ous offenders and for those offenders most susceptible to the deter-
rent effects of arrest. Society, however, must be willing to use jail
space to incarcerate batterers:
If we are going to make a difference in the murder rate in America, we
ought to do something about spouse abuse, because we can make a differ-
ence by a different kind of treatment. Then we move a long way toward
changing the debate, moving away from the idea that it is a trivial pursuit
or a negotiation between people involved in a sovereignty. When we bring up
205. Unchecked officer discretion, however, raises the same issue of victim autonomy, since an
officer can decide to forego arrest even if the victim is insistent.
206. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text (describing permissive arrest and pro-
arrest policies).
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murder, it sounds more important than if we bring up personal relations; so
we have to recast it.
07
Domestic violence far too often results in serious injury."' In light
of the fact that domestic violence poses a greater threat to women
than any other violent crime, and in consideration of the fact that
this crime is the leading cause of injury among women, this trade-
off regarding jail space should be mandated.
A pro-arrest strategy would avoid two of the major problems
which a mandatory arrest law would face in Illinois. First, by pre-
serving discretion, a pro-arrest policy does not pose the same threat
of counterproductivity which arises when all abusers are treated the
same.209 Moreover, by necessarily imposing incarceration in only
certain circumstances, a pro-arrest policy has a greater chance of
maximizing the certainty and severity of punishment and thus
achieving deterrence.
A successful law enforcement effort to reduce domestic violence
must also address the issue of prosecution of offenders,, because
"[u]nless there is prosecution following arrest, law enforcement is
fiction. '2 10 Strict no-drop prosecutorial policies, like mandatory ar-
rest policies, attempt to combat this problem by eliminating needed
flexibility. 1 Intervention programs, however, which counsel victims
from the beginning of the prosecutorial process and work to en-
courage them to follow through with charges of abuse, are more
successful.2 12 These "victim-witness" programs recognize "the spe-
cial circumstances that vulnerable victims [face] in the prosecution
process: intimidation and fear of reprisal, a possibly lengthy adjudi-
cation process, and cutoff from basic social supports such as cash or
housing." ' 1 These multi-dimensional intervention programs offer
counseling, legal advocacy, and "links to critical social services" in
an attempt to make follow-through plausible." By limiting -
207. James K. Stewart, The View From the National Institute of Justice, in FAMILY VIO-
LENCE: RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 228, 229 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990).
208. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (explaining that domestic violence is a leading
cause of death and injury among women).
209. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text (detailing the findings of the Omaha and
Milwaukee studies, which indicated that arrest might be counterproductive for some offenders).
210. Cahn & Lerman, supra note 110, at 97.
211. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text (comparing the levels of flexibility found
in permissive, pro-, and mandatory arrest statutes).
212. Beck, Note, supra note 126, at 1045-46.
213. Fagan, supra note 92, at 66.
214. Id.
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rather than eliminating - prosecutorial discretion, and by encour-
aging victims to follow through with charges of abuse, successful
prosecution of offenders can be achieved.2""
Programs worthy of emulation in Illinois attempt to modify all
stages of the prosecution process.21 6 Such programs: (1) turn over
the control regarding whether charges are filed to prosecutors in-
stead of to victims; (2) help alleviate the pressure put on victims to
drop charges; and (3) ultimately result in prosecutors taking abuse
cases more seriously.21 7 If prosecutors are also required to sign com-
plaints themselves, rather than requiring the signature of the victim,
another signal is sent to the victim and the batterer that it is the
state who is charging and punishing the abuser.21 8 Programs which
enable the prosecutor to pursue convictions even without the cooper-
ation of the victim, through the use of photographs and eyewitness
testimony in lieu of victim testimony, further show that the system
itself is taking responsibility for bringing the batterer to justice.21 9
Finally, programs which provide victim advocates and counselors
who work closely with victims and prosecutors are successful in in-
creasing the rate of victim cooperation. 2
As illustrated by the Exchange Theory, deterrence is effectuated
by increasing the costs of battering and decreasing the rewards. 22 1
Arrest policies focus on raising the costs of battering, with varying,
and disputed, effects. Treatment for batterers, on the other hand,
attempts to change the equation from the other direction by de-
creasing the rewards. Little is yet known about the long-term suc-
cess of rehabilitative intervention with men who batter.222 Critics
215. See Lisa G. Lerman, Expansion of Police Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention,
in RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY 1, 2 (1980) (arguing that increased prosecution and
arrest are mutually reinforcing, because police will arrest offenders more frequently if they believe
they will be charged and prosecuted).
216. Cahn & Lerman, supra note 110, at 97.
217. Id. at 100-01.
218. Id. at 101.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 102. For example, the San Francisco Family Violence Project reported that in the
first year it established a victim advocacy program to aid prosecutors and victims, 70 percent of
victims assisted said they would not have pursued their cases without advocacy assistance. Id. at
103.
221. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Exchange Theory).
222. Jeffrey L. Edelson, Judging the Success of Interventions With Men Who Batter, in FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 92, 130, 145 (Douglas J. Besharov ed.,
1990); see also STAR. supra note 34, at 39-47 (discussing rehabilitative techniques which have
been successful as well as those which should be avoided).
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who oppose providing treatment for batterers argue that assuming
abusers can change offers a false sense of security to the women
they abuse. 2 3 Those who argue in favor of treatment, however, con-
tend that successful intervention necessitates longer2"' and more
therapeutic counseling, which focuses on the man's psychological
problems rather than just on behavioral issues.225 Evidence does not
conclusively demonstrate that treating the batterer necessarily re-
sults in long-term success. The prospect of successful treatment,
however, holds out hope that batterers will stop abusing women in
both their current and future relationships. The result could be a
systemic decrease in domestic abuse. Therefore, funding long-term,
therapeutic treatment for batterers will allow researchers to further
analyze how treatment can be used to intervene effectively.
Although this Comment has primarily focused on programs which
might deter the batterer, it should be noted that the problem of do-
mestic violence cannot be curbed without offering commensurate
support to the victims of domestic violence. Victim support services
such as shelters and counseling programs are therefore critical com-
ponents of any attempt to combat battering. A temporary shelter
offers the battered women a safe place to stay as well as hope that
the cycle of violence can be broken: "Women who left the authorita-
rian relationships within their homes were exposed to democratic
decisionmaking within the transition homes. They experienced
women, who like them, had left the victimization and were now able
to make their own decisions about housing, child rearing, and
jobs. ' 22 6 Shelters can encourage women to break the cycle of abuse
by leaving their abuser, and can help victims explore their options
within a secure environment. When the batterer is arrested and
incarcerated, the victim is afforded time to change her situation. But
this benefit is meaningless if the woman has nowhere to turn. The
existence of social supports for the victim are necessary so that she
223. Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 151.
224. It is argued that most programs currently in operation are short-term, not sufficiently in-
depth, and can result in more harm than good. Id.
225. Id.
226. Irma MacKay, Educating the Professional to Aid Abuse Victims in Achieving Human
Rights, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 203, 205 (Emilio C. Viano ed.,
1992.
227. Richard Berk et al., What a Difference a Day Makes: An Empirical Study of the Impact
of Shelters for Battered Women, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 481, 488 (1986); Mary Ann Dutton-
Douglas & Dorothy Dionne, Counseling and Shelter Services for Battered Women, in WOMAN
BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 113, 122-23 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991).
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can effect a change. In essence, by providing emergency shelters,
counseling programs, and economic support, communities can help
battered women help themselves.2 2 8
CONCLUSION
The mandatory arrest of batterers, though well intentioned, is not
likely to deter subsequent violence in all situations. Moreover, as
with unemployed abusers, an arrest can be counterproductive, actu-
ally increasing the risks to the battered woman. For that very rea-
son, it is necessary to preserve some level of police discretion to as-
sess the utility of arrest in preventing repeat incidents of abuse in
specific cases.
A mandatory arrest law would be neither desirable nor feasible in
Illinois. A pro-arrest policy is a less dogmatic alternative which,
coupled with a coordinated program, has the potential to alter the
cost/benefit ratio associated with battering without mandating the
imposition of risks on the victim.
Donna M. Welch
228. See Pence, supra note 96, at 265 (noting that "[t]wo of the reasons women are trapped in
an abusive relationship are lack of information about battering and lack of an opportunity, for at
least a short time, to stand outside of the situation," and that shelters exist to provide "support for
women making decisions about their lives and [to assist] women in taking back control of their
lives").
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